The aim of this article is to analyze how financial heterogeneity can accentuate the cyclical divergences inside a monetary union that faces technological, monetary and financial shocks. To this purpose, this study relies on a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model, where the two countries are supposed to be differently sensitive to the bank capital channel. The model allows us to demonstrate how a given symmetric shock causes cyclical divergences inside a heterogeneous monetary union. On this point, it allows reproducing some stylized facts recently observed in the UE. Moreover, it appears that the more heterogeneous the union, the larger the effects of financial asymmetries on the transmission of shocks. Finally, we show that a common monetary policy contributes to worsen cyclical divergences, in comparison with monetary policies that would be nationally conducted.
Introduction
The structural heterogeneity inside the European Monetary Union is largely documented and commented 1 . Despite the attempts of convergence made by national governments, recent studies 2 have concluded that the financial system remains far from being integrated. More precisely, among the five main financial markets usually analyzed (money, government bond, corporate bond, banking credit and equity market), the banking markets appear as the most heterogeneous 3 . As shown during the subprime mortgage crisis, banks widely contribute to the propagation of shocks, and in particular of financial ones, which have become recurrent over the last two decades (cf. the EMS crisis, the spillovers of the Asian financial crisis, the "dot-com bubble" boom and burst, etc.). In this perspective, several recent contributions 4 have highlighted the relevance of the Bank Capital Channel (BCC), according to which banks' balance sheet structures may act as an amplifier for the transmission of shocks to the real economy. Theoretically, because of an agency problem between banks and their creditors, the formers bear an external financial premium that is negatively related to their capital ratio (and so is counter-cyclical). The main issue is that this banks' external financing premium is ultimately passed on to the firms' credit conditions, what amplifies initial shocks. The Euro Area Lending Surveys published during the 2007-2008 period have underlined the tightening of credit standards for loans to firms following the previous financial shock. And this appears clearly as a consequence of the growing banks' costs of funds and their inability to access market financing. This confirms the existence of a BCC in Europe. But this channel is not homogeneous. Indeed, considering simultaneously the main factors underlying the BCC, an empirical study by Badarau-Semenescu & Levieuge (2010) indicates that European countries are ought to be more (Germany, Italy, Netherland) or less (Finland, France, Spain) sensitive to this mechanism. For these reasons, the BCC constitutes an interesting way to model the effects of financial heterogeneity in Europe. If empirical studies clearly report these financial asymmetries, theoretical models -in particular DSGE models -most often do not. Moreover, they pay no attention to the role of banks in propagating shocks 5 . It is then impossible to suitably 1) understand and assess the effects of these structural asymmetries on cyclical divergences and 2) evaluate the macroeconomic policies that are likely to mitigate these effects.
1 See for instance Jondeau & Sahuc (2008) , Sekkat & Malek Mansour (2005) , Angeloni & Ehrmann (2007) , Ekinci & Al. (2007 ), Hofmann & Remsperger (2005 , Lane (2006) . 2 See Baele & Al. (2004) and ECB (2008) . 3 Price differentials remain high, and home biases in lending to and borrowing of small non-financial corporations and households are persistent. National specificities in the firms' and banks' financial structures are documented for instance in Chatelain & Al. (2003) or . 4 For theoretical contributions see Blum & Hellwig (1995) , Chen (2001) , Sunirand (2003) , Van den Heuvel (2006) , Gerali & Al. (2008) , Levieuge (2009a) , Meh & Moran (2010) . To this respect Gertler & Kiyotaki (2009) analyze the case of a capital quality shock to explain the role of financial intermediaries in the propagation of the recent crisis. For empirical evidence, see for instance Peek & Al. (2000) , Gambacorta & Mistrulli (2004) . 5 See O. Issing (2006) In this empirical and theoretical context, the aim of this article is to develop a two-country DSGE model with four basic improvements regarding to the existing literature. First, referring to empirical evidence and responding to the deficiencies of standard DSGE models, we consider an explicit Bank Capital Channel, in a tractable but non-trivial way. Second, we consider that the two countries belong to a monetary union. Third, in line with empirical evidence, these two countries are supposed to be financially (structurally) heterogeneous 6 . Finally, we do not only consider monetary and technological shocks, but also financial ones.
All in all, these improvements allow a better understanding of the way financial heterogeneity accentuates the cyclical divergences between the members of a monetary union. Precisely, we demonstrate how a given symmetric shock causes cyclical divergences inside a heterogeneous monetary union. The model reproduces some stylized facts of the recent period. Moreover, we show that the more heterogeneous the union, the larger the effects of financial asymmetries on the transmission of shocks. Finally, it appears that a common monetary policy contributes to worsen the cyclical divergences. On these grounds, this contribution can be seen as a first step whose extensions would be the evaluation of monetary and budgetary policies that are likely to mitigate the effects of financial asymmetries. Again, the literature based on DSGE models usually neglects this question, for the more in a context of a two-country monetary union model.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the technical features of the baseline model, scrutinizing the partial (financial) and the general equilibriums. The third section exhibits the dynamics of the model and illustrates the adverse effects of the structural financial asymmetries in a monetary union. The fourth section demonstrates how a common monetary policy exacerbates these negative effects in such a context. The last section formulates some concluding remarks.
The baseline model
The model, based on Bernanke & Al. (1999) , Sunirand (2003) and Levieuge (2009a) , describes a two-country monetary union with heterogeneous national banking structures. The main structure for each member country is depicted in appendix 1. Six categories of national agents act in each economy: households, entrepreneurs, retailers, capital producers, banks and a government. A common Central Bank is also considered.
Households supply labour and own the retail firms. They receive wages from entrepreneurs and profits from retailers, and use them for consumption and savings. Because the model consists of a two-country monetary union, domestic households simultaneously consume domestic goods and goods produced in the other country of the union. They also pay lumpsum taxes to the Government, necessary to finance the public expenditures. Entrepreneurs (firms) use labor and capital as input (partially financed by debt) to produce wholesale final goods, in perfectly competitive markets. Retailers buy wholesale goods from the producers. They slightly differentiate them (with no costs) and retail them in a monopolistic competition market. CES aggregates of retail products are bought by households and by capital producers. The latter transform retail goods in capital (used by the entrepreneurs, in the production process). 6 Previous examples of monetary policy analysis in two-country models with different financial systems are provides by Faia (2002) or Gilchrist & Al. (2002) . The latter in particular settles for introducing asymmetric firms' balance sheet channels within a monetary union and analyzes the transmission of technological shocks. We extend their study considering the effects of a bank capital channel and different shocks.
A particular attention is paid to the banking markets, where the financial heterogeneity is considered. The role of banks is twofold in the model: on one hand, they participate as lenders to the firms. On the other hand, they collect funds from households (so as to insure the firms financing). The next subsections go into detail in the financial contracts describing the financial intermediation, before finally describing the aggregate relations of the DSGE model.
The terms of the financial contracts between banks and entrepreneurs
Be the case of a representative firm (entrepreneur) i. To produce wholesale final goods for the period 1 + t , the entrepreneur buys, at the end of the period t , the capital
Because he cannot entirely self-finance the project, he uses his own net wealth ( ) But at the same time the banker must collect funds from households to finance the entrepreneur. Thus, he must implicitly consider the cost of such operations. Banks operate in a perfectly competitive environment, are neutral to the idiosyncratic risk and to the aggregate risk associated to the banking activity, but adverse to the aggregate risk associated to the entrepreneurs' activity 8 . In the seminal model of Bernanke & Al. (1999) , the banks' portfolios are infinitely large, and the idiosyncratic risk i ω is completely diversified.
Households are thus sure to benefit from a riskless return when they lend to banks, and the financing cost for banks does not depend on their capital structure. But, a more realistic
ω is a random variable that follows a log-normal distribution of mean 2 / 2 σ − and standard deviation σ , independent and identically distributed among firms and in time. It fulfills all general conditions for the existence of the financial contract. See Bernanke & Al. (1999) , Sunirand (2003) or Levieuge (2009b) assumption is that banks' loan portfolios are of finite size. The risk associated with the firms' investment projects is thus partly transferred to banks (which can now default), and ultimately to households. By analogy with the bank-firm relation, the return on the loans portfolio of the bank is supposed to be private information. A creditor household has to engage a costly state procedure to observe the return of the bank to which he has lent funds, if the bank declares bankruptcy. A second agency problem then arises, now between banks (borrower) and households (lender), whose treatment will render the external financing costly for banks and will oblige them to accumulate inside capital. Like in Krasa & Villamil (1992) , households perform the role of 'monitoring the monitors'. To maintain the model tractability at the aggregate level, we follow hereafter Sunirand (2003) when supposing that a bank can only participate to the investment projects of one firm 9 . In such a way, the idiosyncratic risk is fully diversified at the aggregate level, but not at the bank level. This assumption also allows to simplify hereafter the notations, by renouncing to indices i and j . In such a context, at the period t , the representative bank uses its inside accumulated capital ( ) t NB and other complementary funds raised from households
to a representative firm. According to the aforementioned assumptions, the risk of the firm ( )
is directly transferred to the bank's balance sheet. 
Let's denote by
The left-hand-side of the relation (2) corresponds to the gain obtained by the banker from financing the entrepreneur, in the bad scenario, when the firm goes bankruptcy and the bank pays the monitoring cost ( ) B µ . The right-hand-side of (2) gives the amount of the banker's pledge towards the household. As in Sunirand (2003) , the threshold value for the bank's bankruptcy is always lower than the threshold value calculated for the firm's default ( )
. The banks default is always conditional to the previous default of firms. But the defaulting of a firm does not necessarily imply that its bank goes bankrupt. If, after the costly verification procedure, the banks can recuperate sufficient funds to pay the households, they can survive. Three situations are thus possible: i)
, in which case there is no default and the financial contract runs without any difficulty; ii)
, in which case only the entrepreneur goes bankrupt, while the banker receives sufficient funds after the monitoring procedure to pay the creditor household; and iii)
, when entrepreneur and bank declare default, and the household starts a costly verification of the banker, whose cost ( ) A µ is proportional to the bank's gross return:
( )
In this context, the terms of the contract between the bank and the entrepreneur come from the resolution of an optimization program that seeks to maximize the entrepreneur's expected benefits, subject to the participation condition for the bank, and implicitly to that for the household 11 . The solutions of this program give the firm demand for capital and the value of the thresholds [ ]
In a logarithmic form, F t S simply defines the firm's external finance premium in the model, i. e. the difference between the net return on the firm's physical capital required by the bank ( )
and the risk-free rate ( ) Bernanke & Al. (1999) , the firm's external finance premium does not only depend on the firm's financial position
1 , but also on the accumulated inside capital of the bank ( ) t NB . All things being equal, the lower the firm's net wealth ( ) t NF , the higher the cost of its external financing. Moreover, it depends on the bank's financial situation. As F t S negatively depends on t NB in (3), the lending interest rate required by a badcapitalized bank is ought to be higher than that charged by a healthier one. This fact clearly shows the internalization by the entrepreneurs of the banks' external financing costs. So much so that a deterioration in banks' balance sheet finally implies a tightening of the lending conditions to firms. This is the bank capital channel manifestation, previously discussed.
The terms of the financial contracts between banks and households
Contracting with firms, the banks also interact with households to collect funds. Households are neutral to the idiosyncratic risk, but averse to the aggregate risk 13 . They elaborate their gain expectations on the basis of the average (aggregate) return of banks in the economy ( ) B t R 1 + . As previously, the lender (household) knows that the return of the borrower (bank) is subject to an idiosyncratic (and not spontaneously observable) risk 14 , noted 1
supposed to follow a log-normal distribution similar to that of 1 + t ω . Precisely, a threshold 1 + t ε exists for the banker, under which he goes bankrupt. This threshold value satisfies the condition:
11 As discussed hereafter in the description of the DSGE model, the participation constraints of the different agents to the financial contract refer to the opportunity cost given by the risk-free rate.
12 Details on the explicit form of the optimization program and its solution are available in the separate Technical Appendix. 13 It means that the aggregate risk will be borne by firms and banks. The mechanism which protects households from the aggregate risk is the following. The non-default interest rate on bank securities are predetermined at the end of period t . So, if in 1 + t , the effective return on non-idiosyncratic component of firms' or banks' investments is lower than expected, households will be compensated with the higher non-default interest rate on bank securities. 14 In other words, not only a defaulting entrepreneur can drag a bank down with him, as we have seen in the previous subsection, but also a bank can declare bankruptcy because of an adverse idiosyncratic shock. 
Besides, the value of the firm ( ) t VF is given by the gross return on capital, after the repayment of the debt and of the associated interests. So, for
− given in (3):
In a similar way, the bank inside capital comes mainly from the accumulated benefits of the intermediation activity, i. 
The general equilibrium model
With a Cobb-Douglas constant return to scale technology for firms and an equivalent condition to define the banks' activity, the individual equations (3) and (5) to (11) 
Price indexes for the two countries are respectively:
, and the law of one price is supposed to hold.
Households choose a sequence of consumption, labour, bank securities ( ) t A and other possible financial investment ( ) t D at the real risk-free interest rate, which maximizes an intertemporal utility function, based on (12), subject to the following budget constraint: Wholesale producers combine labour and capital with a Cobb-Douglas constant return to scale technology: As in Levieuge (2009a) the profit maximization of capital producers is internalized in this program. The first two conditions define the labour demands. The third gives the Tobin's Q ratio. The last relation represents the expected gross return to holding a unity of capital from t to 1 + t . At the optimum, the firms' demand for capital insures the equality between the expected marginal cost for the external financing and the expected marginal return on capital. Retailers are represented by firms, held by households, which purchase wholesale goods and retail them afterwards. Their main role is to differentiate final goods. In so doing, they allow introducing price inertia in the model. Following Calvo (1983) , it is assumed that a retailer changes his price with probability ς − 1 , in a given period. Subsequently, the retailer pricing behavior leads to the following 'new Phillips curves' in the two countries of the union: A financial shock is added to this model -as well as technological, budgetary and monetary shocks that are introduced in equations (16), (22) and (23) respectively. In previous equations, t Q represents the fundamental value of the firms' physical capital, given by the actualized amount of dividends to be obtained by the firms' shareholders. We now allow for the possibility that the market value of the capital, denoted hereafter by Q of the capital only at this period; afterwards, starting from the t+1 period, the equality between m t Q and t Q holds again 19 . Hence, in case of financial shock, the fundamental return on the physical capital given in Table 2 becomes an abnormal return on capital given by:
Then, m t Q replaces t Q in the equations (3), (4), (5) and (8), respectively defining the dynamics of firms' net worth, banks' net worth, and the subsequent external finance premiums. So, when t m t Q Q > , the firms' and banks' net values increase without any fundamental justification. The seeming improvement of their balance sheet allows them to obtain better conditions for external financing, stimulating the national investment and output (and inversely in case of adverse financial shock).
The model parameterization
The calibration for the parameters and the variables (or ratios) at their steady-state is made according to the references found in the literature for the euro area. Ratios such as capital/GDP, investment/GDP or total consumption/GDP are all compatible with the estimations revealed by Fagan & Al. (2001) . Moreover, it is realistically supposed that banks have a lower default probability than firms, and that the ratio B NB belongs to the interval [ ]
. 20 Finally, the probability for a bank to leave the credit market is lower than for firms, and as already evoked, the audit is more costly for households than for banks. The calibration for the baseline model is detailed in appendix 3.
Financial asymmetries and transmission of shocks inside the union
In line with empirical evidence, financial structural heterogeneity is now introduced in the model, by assuming that the banks financial leverage at their steady-state and the sensibility coefficient of the banks' external finance premium to their financial structure ( )
ψ are not similar in the two countries. We then analyze the sensitivity of the national dynamics to the degree of the union's financial heterogeneity.
Transmission of shocks and dynamics of the model
We assume that the banking system in country 2 is better capitalized than in country 1 are chosen for the baseline calibration. To concentrate on the asymmetric effects only due to the bank capital channel, we consider that both countries are identical in the firm-side. So, besides the symmetrical financial accelerator related to the firms' financial situation, we expect to obtain an additional and asymmetrical financial accelerator due to the banking sectors heterogeneity. This is verified in the Figure 1 , which represents the dynamics 22 of the two countries of the union following an unexpected fall in the market value of the physical capital ( ) m Q . This shock negatively affects the agents' net worth, their financial position and the external finance premium they must bear. Two factors contribute to these dissimilar national adjustments. First, national banks face higher external finance premium in country 1 because of their deeper financial fragility and because of the higher sensitivity to their balance sheet structure. The cost of the firms' external finance is subsequently higher, reducing the incentive to invest and the aggregate demand in turn. As a result, inflation falls more in country 1. Second, as the Central Bank reduces the common nominal interest rate accordingly to the average inflation rate, the real interest rate increases more in country 1 than in country 2. In the absence of union, the national Central Bank of the country 1 would have cut its policy rate more than a common Central Bank (with average objectives) would have done. This reinforces the adverse macroeconomic effects of the initial shock (section 4 goes into detail on this point). Subsequently, the investment drop is more than 100% higher in country 1, and inflation and output divergences are important within the union. As a rule, the national divergences are large despite the low calibrated values for the elasticity of banks' finance premium to their respective balance sheet structures. The (heterogeneous) bank capital channel is then potentially very powerful.
This theoretical simulation matches the recently observed pattern of financial and macroeconomic variables in the EA. According to Badarau-Semenescu & Levieuge (2010) , Italy is typically ought to be more sensitive 23 to the BCC than France (i.e. Italy would be the country 1 and France the country 2). Precisely, the figures in appendix 2, in line with the figure 1, show that French and Italian lending rates to firms have spread away starting autumn 2007. Moreover, while output and investment have similarly evolved in both countries before the year 2007, they have clearly diverged since. In the light of the theoretical simulations, the financial asymmetries (and more precisely the differences in bank capital channel strength) can explain the diverging cyclical evolution of European countries in the wave of the financial crisis.
The next subsection demonstrates that the more heterogeneous the union is, the larger the effect of financial asymmetries on the transmission of shocks.
Sensitivity of the economies to the degree of financial heterogeneity
Two sources of financial asymmetries are successively analyzed, following a negative financial shock. First, the figure 2 illustrates the sensitivity of the economies to differences in terms of national banking systems leverage. While the elasticity coefficient for the banks' external finance ( ) 
The costs of a heterogeneous monetary union
As briefly evoked previously, it can be demonstrated that the conduct of a single monetary policy for the (financially asymmetric) union as a whole worsens the cyclical divergences. When considering a symmetric monetary shock in the baseline model, preliminary simulations indicate that the reaction of the output of the country 1 (stronger affected by the bank capital channel) is instantly 60% higher than in country 2. In contrast, if each country were supposed to conduct autonomously its monetary policy, the output response in the country 1 would be only 20% higher than in country 2. 24 In other words, a common monetary policy in an asymmetric union implies a stabilization bias. Figure 4 illustrates the rationale for this stabilization bias in a context of negative and symmetric financial shock. 24 The model then provides results that are quantitatively in accordance with Sunirand (2003) and Levieuge (2009a) for a single country. 
National monetary policy
Country 2: weak bank capital channel Country 1: high bank capital channel As a common monetary policy seeks to stabilize the average inflation of the whole area, the interest rate cut is more important in the union than what a national monetary policy would imply for country 2 (which is by definition less sensitive to shocks). Subsequently, this economy benefits from lower real interest rates, which mitigates its decrease in investment and output, and immunizes it to shocks as a whole. On the contrary, for symmetrical reasons, the participation to the asymmetric monetary union implies more adverse reactions to shocks (compared to a national conduct of monetary policy) for the country with a stronger bank capital channel. Thus, a single monetary policy that only reacts to average variables of an asymmetric union worsens the cyclical divergences among member countries.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to offer a general theoretical framework suited to analyze the effects of the financial heterogeneity inside a monetary union, paying attention to the bank capital channel (which has generated great interest for several years), and to financial shocks (which are now recurrent). This has led us to build a two-country DSGE model, calibrated in reference to previous studies for the euro area. This model generates conventional dynamics, but with deeper amplification of shocks, because of the effects of the financial accelerator and the bank capital channel. Simulations indicate that structural and precisely financial asymmetries lead to striking cyclical divergences among members of the Union. This is true in case of financial shocks, what illustrates the diverging individual responses of European countries following the subprime mortgage crisis. To this respect, it is shown that the more financially heterogeneous the Union is, the larger the cyclical divergences. Moreover, the conduct of a single monetary policy for the Union as a whole seriously worsens these national divergences.
These results call for an analysis of the macroeconomic policies that could mitigate the effects of financial heterogeneity. The on-going extensions of this model allow us to investigate whether the monetary policy should rely on the national dispersion of inflation, and how national budgetary policies should be combined. 
